Friday, June 02, 2006
The time has come to ditch email
Comment Back in 1972, by some accounts (http://www.livinginternet.com/e/ei.htm), a new form of communication known as email was born. It was a practical implementation of electronic messaging that was first seen on local timeshare computers in the 1960s. I can only imagine how much fun and revolutionary it must have been to use email in those early years, to have been at the bleeding edge of the curve.
Almost ten years later, in November 1981, Jonathan Postel published RFC 788 (http://rfc.sunsite.dk/rfc/rfc788.html) (later deprecated by RFC 821 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0821.txt), also by Postel, and RFC 822 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0822.txt) by David Crocker), thereby inventing the foundations of the Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) - a proposal that would revolutionize email again. Since that time, email has become as important an invention to the world as the telegraph and the telephone, and it has long been synonymous with the internet itself.
Twenty five years later, we still use essentially the same protocol. And email is a terrible mess. It's dangerous, insecure, unreliable, mostly unwanted, and out-of-control. It's the starting point for a myriad of criminal activity, banking scams, virus outbreaks, identity theft, extortion, stock promotion scams, and of course, the giant iceberg of spam (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12480457/).
The problem is, email is now integral to the lives of perhaps a billion people, businesses, and critical applications around the world. It's a victim of its own success. It's a giant ship on a dangerous collision course. All sorts of brilliant, talented people today put far more work into fixing SMTP in various ways (with anti-virus, anti-phishing technologies, anti-spam, anti-spoofing cumbersome encryption technologies, and much more) than could have ever been foreseen in 1981. But it's all for naught.
A sinking ship
All the work spent fixing email is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Email is a sinking ship and it should be abandoned just as other insecure technologies like telnet, ftp and the beloved Usenet nntp were "abandoned" years ago. All these old technologies actually live on and in some cases thrive (and in the case of the Usenet, still consume (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usenet) enormous amounts (http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&rls=en&q=Usenet+binary&btnG=Search) of bandwidth and offer very useful (http://groups.google.com/) information) but have been mostly superceded by newer protocols. Email should be abandoned in much the same way. The problem is, more people depend on email than ever before.
The main reason we will never win the email war against the spammers-phishers-scammers-botnets and their assorted ilk is we're bound by legal standards that limit the ways we can combat email abuse – unlike in the early days of the internet. The perpetrators are not bound by the law (http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11392). Therefore the good guys can't win. The only solution is to change the rules. We need to abandon our email infrastructure and concede that the spamming-phishing-virus-writing scumbags have won; moving on is only inevitable.
The problem is, we lack "something better" to abandon email for.
Starting from scratch
Email in its current form will never, ever, ever be spam-free. It will never be virus-phishing-scam free. It will cost companies and individuals billions of dollars (http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/3350891) in theft, criminal activity, and the reality of spam will grow from the 50-70 per cent it is today to 90 per cent of all traffic. Email will continue to harm millions of people through banking scams, identity theft, viruses, and more. Email will never be secure, because it was never designed to be secure.
The only solution is to start from scratch. Develop a new email system and make it secure. Use existing, proven technologies and a few new and novel ideas – starting with the latest encoding mechanisms, a reliable hashing algorithm, fast compression, strong encryption and signatures. Build an electronic identity. Encode, hash, encrypt, compress, sign, and provide a novel way to share keys when needed, for example. I don't know how this will all turn out, but perhaps yEnc, MD5, AES, H.264, and GPG are some potential technologies that could be used together. A new transport protocol would need to be flexible enough that any of these technologies could be replaced, transparently to the user, as better and stronger options become available. It would need to be seamless for the client – no more messy GPG or other stop-gap solutions that few people actually use. Secure email should be a mandatory "secure bundle" of email that is safe for sending a credit card number to a business or someone I know.
I don't want to think about any of this when I send secure e-mail, however. I just want to type my email and press Send. If I need my secure identity plugged in, say, from a USB key, fine.
The basics of communication
One of the great joys of computers is that newer, better technologies supercede the older insecure ones, yet both the old and new generations still live happily together. There are so many examples of this, I won't even bother listing them here. A completely new, secure email system would be the internet's next big critical application. If it required IPv6 addressing, maybe secure email would also kill those ridiculous "tiered internet (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4552138.stm)" ideas with one stone. But I'm just thinking aloud.
I'm a messaging junkie. Today's store-and-forward email is fundamentally broken, but I still like the concept very much. Instant messaging is too instant, and peer-to-peer networking is, ironically, too anonymous. Video conferencing is fantastic – if it's someone you know, and they're online (and you've combed your hair). Written communication is never going away. We're tied into an antiquated email system that needs to be abandoned and replaced.
I would love to see a secure email system that did all the hard-crunching on the client and perhaps generated a unique private-public key for each piece of mail, without user interaction. However it is done, let's make it rather mathematically difficult to send email, and even more difficult to send email to many recipients – while the process remains very simple to the end user. Make it a requirement that one mail sent to a thousand recipients securely would require a very fast client doing unique encoding, hashing, compression, and encryption on each piece of mail just to send it. I enjoy the thought of a spammer needing a giant Bewolf cluster ranked rather high up in the Top 500 (http://www.top500.org/) list of supercomputers to send one piece of spam to ten million people. At that point, the source of spam and the spammer himself would be a little bit easier to track down.
Simply complex
Before you skip to the end of this column and submit your comment, telling me that I'm crazy or uninformed, understand that I realize the problem with email is very complex. It would be nice if the solution "appeared" to be rather simple. I've spent the past 18 years with an email address of some sort, dating back to 1988, and I get more email than most. But like most people, I'm just an end-user of email and it's very clear that email is a sinking ship. And millions of people were online in the 1980s before me.
Getting email clients to work with a new infrastructure will be a major hurdle, and the plumbing itself will take some time. Getting major ISPs and Yahoo Mail, Gmail and Hotmail to adapt an open solution will be even harder. Fine. There are many technical hurdles. But time and again, truly innovative technology will catch on. With the rise of the web, HTTPS and SSL, Napster, SSH, BitTorrent, and so much more, superior technologies have created many new storms.
With all the security problems stemming from 1981's nuclear explosion of SMTP, it seems only fitting that the bright minds in the security community should develop the internet's next killer app.
A gateway
Far too much effort is spent preserving today's name@somewhere.com format, to the exclusion of everything else. The @ symbol was a novel hack, so let's find a similar new one.
Maybe I'm dreaming, but a gateway from e-mail to a new secure e-mail infrastructure, electronic identity or e-num system might be the first place to start. Perhaps using one of the reserved symbols first outlined way back in RFC 821 or 822, whether it's a bangpath secure!name@somewhere.com, or secure?name@somewhere.com or name=secure@somewhere.com might work – but it would have to degrade nicely with current email systems. However it's done, a very simple, elegant solution would be a fantastic way to start.
I'm confident that there is no solution using today's massive email infrastructure problems, because so many bright people have been working on it for such a long time. Maybe I am indeed dreaming that we can "abandon" today's email SMTP much like the Usenet's NNTP was "abandoned" years ago for something better – because that "something better" for email still doesn't even exist.
Copyright © 2006, SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com/)
Kelly Martin has been working with networks and security since 1986, and he's editor for SecurityFocus, Symantec's online magazine.
source:http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/06/01/ditch_email/print.html
WSJ: Microsoft Expects Adobe to File Antitrust Suit
The two companies have been in discussions over the use of Adobe's Portable Document Format, or PDF, within Microsoft's Office suite of applications, the Journal reported, quoting Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith.
Adobe wants Microsoft to remove the feature and offer Adobe's technology separately for a fee. Microsoft has agreed to remove the feature, but is unwilling to charge for it, the Journal reported.
Representatives of Microsoft and Adobe were not immediately reachable for comment.
In February, Adobe Chief Executive Bruce Chizen told Reuters he considered Microsoft to be the company's biggest concern. "The competitor I worry about most is Microsoft," Chizen said at the time.
Adobe's PDF technology lets producers create and distribute documents digitally that retain designs, pictures and formatting.
source:http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1970866,00.asp
11th Circuit to Webmasters: Telling Someone To Go Away Doesn't Make Them
The Eleventh Circuit in the case of Snow v. DirecTV held that a webmaster may not exclude certain persons from his site merely by telling them their access is unauthorized.
In this case, Michael Snow was the webmaster of Stop Corporate Extortion, a "private support group website for "individuals who have been, are being, or will be sued by any Corporate entity." In order to access Snow's site, a user was required to register a username and password, and to agree to a statement affirming that the user was not associated with DirecTV, inc. He claimed that several agents of DirecTV ignored this warning and accessed his site. According to Snow, such unauthorized access violated the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which forbids accessing an electronic communication "without authorization."
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim. According to the court, the SCA does not apply to communications which are "readily accessible to the general public." On Snow's site, any member of the general public could access the site by merely registering with a username and password and clicking on the words "I Agree to these terms." Such an easily surmountable barrier to access is, according to the court, insufficient to make a site not "readily acessible to the general public."
While the court did not explain just what sort of security measures would invoke the SCA, it did hint that a webmaster who "screens the registrants before granting access" would have a stronger claim than one who merely asks his registrants to "self screen[ ]."
source:http://www.acsblog.org/ip-and-tech-law-2883-11th-circuit-to-webmasters-telling-someone-to-go-away-doesnt-make-them.html
The Worst: Stupid Engineering Mistakes
1. St. Francis Dam, 1928
Self-taught engineer William Mulholland built this LA dam on a defective foundation and ignored the geology of the surrounding canyon. He also dismissed cracks that formed as soon as the reservoir behind it was filled. Five days later, it ruptured, killing 450 people and destroying entire towns (along with Mulholland’s career).
2. Kansas City Hyatt walkways, 1981
Walkways crisscrossing the hotel’s multistory atrium collapsed, domino-style, raining debris and hundreds of people onto the packed dance contest below. The cause: grossly negligent design and use of beams that could support only 30 percent of the load.
3. Vasa, 1628
Three hundred years before the Titanic, the Vasa was the biggest sailing vessel of its day. The overloaded ship ruled the seas for all of a mile before she took on water through her too-low gun ports and promptly capsized.
4. Northeastern US power grid, 1965
A single protective relay tripped in Ontario, overloading nearby circuits and causing a cascade of outages that left 30 million homes without power for up to 13 hours. A fragile, redundancy-free design ensured that it would happen eventually. After decades of repairs and upgrades, it happened again in 2003.
5. McDonnell Douglas DC-10, 1970s
Nearly a thousand people around the world lost their lives while the kinks were being ironed out of this 290-ton competitor to Boeing’s 747. Blown-out cargo doors, shredded hydraulic lines, and engines dropped midflight were just a few of the behemoth’s early problems.
6. Firestone 500 tires, 1970s
These steel-belted radials allowed water to seep under the tread, which caused the belting to rust and the tread to separate, typically at high speeds. Dozens of deaths later, Firestone blamed consumers, then recalled 10 million tires.
7. Purity Distilling Company tank, 1919
You gotta keep your molasses somewhere – how about a rickety tank 50 feet tall and 90 feet in diameter in the middle of Boston? The structure was painted brown to hide the leaks. Eventually it burst (possibly exploding from fermentation), sending waves of molasses up to 15 feet high into the city and killing 21.
8. Skylab, 1973
America’s first space station was hopelessly damaged at launch because designers failed to account for the aerodynamics of the meteoroid shield and solar panels. When crews weren’t busy making repairs, they complained of the extreme heat on board.
9. Citigroup Center, 1978
Last-minute changes to structural braces of this Manhattan tower left it vulnerable to collapse in high winds. With a hurricane bearing down on the city, builders rushed to strengthen it by welding 2-inch steel plates over 200 weakly bolted joints.
10. R101 airship, 1930
Seven years before the Hindenburg disaster, the British thought 5.5 million cubic feet of hydrogen in a bubble of fabric would make for a fun way to get around. On her maiden flight, the airship’s cover was blown open by wind, and from there it was oh-the-humanity city.
source:http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/start.html?pg=9
Mob rule on China's Internet: The keyboard as weapon
source:http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/31/business/chinet.php
Extortion virus code gets cracked
![]() To recover files, victims are asked to buy drugs online |
Poor programming has allowed anti-virus companies to discover the password to retrieve the hijacked data inside a virus that has claimed at least one UK victim.
The Archiveus virus caught out British nurse Helen Barrow and swapped her data with a password-protected file.
The virus is the latest example of so-called "ransomware" that tries to extort cash from victims.
Code breaker
Analysis of Archiveus has revealed that the password to unlock the file containing all the hijacked files is contained within the code of the virus itself.
This virus swaps files found in the "My Documents" folder on Windows with a single file protected by a 30-digit password. Victims are only told the password if they buy drugs from one of three online pharmacies. When I realised what had happened, I just felt sick to the core
The 30-digit password locking the files is "mf2lro8sw03ufvnsq034jfowr18f3cszc20vmw". Using the password should restore all the hijacked files.
"Now the password has been uncovered, there should be no reason for anyone hit by this ransomware attack to have to make any payments to the criminals behind it," said Graham Cluley, senior technology consultant for security firm Sophos.
Archiveus was discovered on 6 May but it took the rest of the month for the first victim, Rochdale nurse Helen Barrow, to emerge.
Ms Barrow is thought to have fallen victim when she responded to an on-screen message warning her that her computer had contracted another unnamed virus. The virus asks those it infects to buy drugs on one of three websites to get their files back.
"When I realised what had happened, I just felt sick to the core," said Ms Barrow about the incident.
The Archiveus virus is only the latest in a series of malicious programs used by extortionists to extract cash from victims. Archiveus seems to use some parts of another ransoming virus called Cryzip that was circulating in March 2006.
source:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/5038330.stm
20 Things You Won't Like About Vista
source:http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/06/01/1638216